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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Criminal Procedure: Miranda Warnings by Federal Officers
Sufficient to Remove "Taint" of Prior Unconsititutional State
Interrogation
In United States v. Knight,' the Second Circuit announced that
the administration by federal officers of the warnings concerning
procedural rights demanded by Miranda v. Arizona2 can isolate a
federal confession from the "taint" of inadmissible prior statements
to state authorities, which were made in a situation of minimal
coercion. The defendant Knight was originally detained by New York
City police when, in response to a police inquiry, he produced a rental
agreement indicating that his car was overdue in California. After
suggesting that the officers accompany him to his apartment to call
the rental agency, Knight described a film mounted on a projector
there as being "dirty." In response to further inquiries, Knight
exhibited the film and stated that he had brought the film and certain
photographs in the room from California. At no time did the police
advise Knight of his constitutional rights. Following his arrest on
local charges, the FBI was summoned; and one of the federal agents,
after removing Knight's handcuffs, informed him of his rights. Knight
again stated that he had brought pornographic material from
California. In the district court the defense sought unsuccessfully to
rebut this admission, and Knight was convicted for the interstate
transportation of obscene materials.' The court of appeals affirmed,
rejecting a challenge to the admissibility of the defendant's
inculpatory statement to federal agents.'
The Miranda decision formulated a catalogue of constitutional
admonitions, concerning the rights to silence and to counsel, that law
enforcement officers must make known to a suspect at the outset of
custodial interrogation.5 If at trial the state cannot prove that such
warnings were given and that the suspect "intelligently and
knowingly" waived his rights 6 then "no evidence obtained as a result
' 395 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1968).
2 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (consolidated for decision with Vignera v. New York, Westover v.
UnitedStates, and California v. Stewart).
'See 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1964).
395' F.2d at 973-75.
384 U.S. at 479.
Id. at 475.
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of interrogation" is admissible.7 The Supreme Court, however, did
not definitely indicate the limitations of this exclusionary rule,"
leaving unanswered the question whether the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" 9 doctrine would apply in a Miranda situation. '" One of the
Miranda cases, Westover v. United States, did concern itself with a
portion of the "poisonous fruits" problem. Westover considered the
factors necessary to sufficiently dissipate the "taint" of an
unconstitutional interrogation so as to permit the introduction into
evidence of a subsequent confession made shortly after the belated
administration of constitutional-rights warnings. After fourteen
hours of state custody and interrogation, without any warnings,
Westover was given the necessary warnings by an FBI agent and
confessed for the first time during a two-hour federal interrogation.
Since the warnings by the federal officers came, from Westover's
viewpoint, at the end of one extended interrogation, the Court was
unable to find a sufficient waiver of constitutional rights." After
implicitly rejecting the rationale that a confession is per se tainted by
any prior unconstitutional attempt to elicit the confession, the Court
established the parameters to be employed in future judicial inquiries
by noting that a different case would be presented if the interrogation
leading to the defendant's confession was "removed both in time and
place" from the original interrogation. 2
The "time and place" criterion has been accepted as the
appropriate test in decisions subsequent to Westover. In Evans v.
United States,'" where three days elapsed between the confession to
state police, invalid because of a failure to warn, and the subsequent
confession to a postal inspector who gave the defendant appropriate
warnings, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the
Westover test had not been fully satisfied since there was no removal
Id. at 479.
.See Pye, Interrogation of Criminal Dejendants-Sone Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35
FORD. L. REV. 199, 216 (1966). Compare 384 U.S. at 500 (dissenting opinion of Clark, J.), with
id. at 545 (dissenting opinion of White, J.). But see Shannon v. State,......._Tenn ..... ,427
S.W.2d 26, 29 (1968) (dictum) (the "poisonous fruits" problem is treated as having been solved
by Westover).
'See generally Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
,"See generally George, The Fruits of Miranda: Scope oJ the Exclusionary Rule, 39 COLO. L.
REV. 478, 492-94 (1967); Pye, supra note 8, at 216-18.
" 384 U.S. at 494-96.
I d. at 496.
' 375 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1967).
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of "place."' 41 In People v. Raddatz,'5 after a detention of one hour and
a short interrogation, the defendant confessed without the benefit of
any warnings. Thirty minutes later he confessed again, this time after
warnings in the office of the state's attorney. Under the teachings of
Westover, the second authority was an unconstitutional
"beneficiary,"'" and warnings alone by this authority could not dis-
sipate the taint.1 7 Similarly, in United States v. Pierce'" there was no
removal in time or place, but the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, dealing with a factual situation quite similar to Knight, chose
to hold the confession inadmissible on the grounds that the suspect
was probably aware of the FBI's knowledge of his prior statements to
the local police and that, therefore, the Miranda waiver was not
"voluntary."'" Three post- Westover cases, however, have dismissed
claims of inadmissibility. In Nobles v. United States'" the Fifth
Circuit indicated that a sufficient removal in time and place had
occurred when the defendant went home after questioning by state
authorities and returned voluntarily to confess to an FBI agent.-" In
Robinson v. State,"2 the tenuous distinction was drawn that Westover
involved a defendant who had not expressly waived his rights.
However, it was noted that the passage of time was one factor
supporting admissibility.- Finally, the Robinson court employed the
time and place test, without citing Westover, in Wiggins v. State-24
when it stated that "a significant passage of time and a change of
environment and of interrogators . .. [would] remove any initial
taint."2
Knight maintained on appeal that Westover required the exclusion
of his confession to the federal officer, since the failure of the local
police to warn him of his rights poisoned the subsequent statement. -26
While the court acknowledged the significant question of whether the
,Id. at 360.
"91 111. App. 2d 425, 235 N.E.2d 353 (1968).
"°See 384 U.S. at 496-97.
* 91 111. App. 2d at _ 235 N.E.2d at 357.
*397 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1968).
19 Id. at_.
10 391 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1968) (per curiam).
2' Id. at 602-03.
-- 3 Md. App. 666, 240 A.2d 638 (1968).
' Id. at _ 240 A.2d at 643.
-_ Md. App. - 241 A.2d 424 (1968).
"- Id. at _., 241 A.2d at 43 1.
26 395 F.2d at 973.
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inquiries made by the local police in the defendant's apartment
constituted such a "custodial interrogation" as would activate the
exclusionary rule of Miranda,"-2 it explicitly assumed that Knight's
responses to state police were inadmissible.'1 Notwithstanding this
assumption, the Second Circuit proceeded to examine the level of
compulsion involved in the interrogation by state police in order to
determine if the statement to the FBI was tainted. The fact that
Knight was at home was considered by the court relevant to this level
of pressure as was the brevity of the state interrogation. The court also
noted that the major elements of the crime had been established by the
"voluntary act" of the defendant when he exhibited the film.
Moreover, the force of having let "the cat out of the bag"29 through
admissions to state authorities was said to be limited by the fact that
Knight was mistaken as to the legal effect of having obtained the
material in California. Accenting this low level of coerciveness, in the
court's opinion, was the federal agent's request that Knight's
handcuffs be removed. The pressures against which Miranda was
directed were said not to be present. The "totality" of these
"circumstances" provided no evidence of a "causal relationship"
between the two statements. Therefore, the court concluded, the giving
of the warnings alone was sufficient to insulate the second statement
from the infirmities of the first."
The Knight rationale denies, by implication, the legitimacy of
Westover. From the perspective of Pierce, Evans, and Raddatz, it is
possible to say that the "time and place" test represents a prescription
by the Supreme Court of two basic parameters by which dissipation
should be measured. Westover indicated that such determinations were
necessarily ad hoc,3' but it did not imply that courts were to be free to
adopt any measure of attenuation. The Knight opinion is void of any
reference to the place of the FBI interrogation. Thus, in emphasizing
such factors as Knight's presence in his home during state
interrogation and the removal of his handcuffs, the Knight court
seemingly rejects the "time and place" test in favor of some ad hoc
27See, e.g., Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. at 478-79; United States v. Gleason, 265 F.
Supp. 880, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); United States v. Knight, 261 F. Supp. 843, 844 (E:D. Pa.
1966); United States v. Littlejohn, 260 F. Supp. 278, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 1966); People v. P., 21
N.Y.2d 1,233 N.E.2d 255, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1967).
2 395 F.2d at 974.
"See United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947).
"395 F.2d at 974-75.
384 U.S. at 496.
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examination of voluntariness. The danger of this approach lies
primarily in its potential as a panacea for Miranda violations. If
future decisions find that the level of coerciveness surrounding the
violation was minimal, it will be easier to avoid the exclusionary rule.
This is contrary to the clear teachings of Miranda which demand
observance whenever the citizen is in custody. While Knight may be a
harbinger of attempts to obviate Miranda, it is suggested that if the
spirit of the Miranda safeguards is to continue to be viable, a better
approach would be to explicate or expand Westover. Several isolation
devices, other than removal in time and place, have been suggested. 2
Procedurally, the rebuttable presumption, developed in decisions
dealing with physical coercion and inducements, 3 that all statements
given after an inadmissible one are tainted, should be specifically
extended to the Westover situation." In addition to the removal in
time and place, a knowing and intelligent waiver should require that
the suspect be informed of the possible inadmissibility of his prior
statement, regardless of how clear it may seem to subsequent
interrogators that the earlier statement is admissible. Absent such a
"possible-inadmissibility" warning, the tainting effect of an earlier
confession should bar the admissibility of the subsequent confession."
Alternatively, the mandatory intervention of counsel in an effective
manner, between the interrogations, would presumably assure the
admissibility of the later statement. Westover is perhaps susceptible of
internal limitation, as well as expansion, but Knight does not
represent the proper approach. It attempts to solve a post-Miranda
problem with pre-Miranda tools.
"See, e.g., Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241, 248-51 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (concurring
opinion of Wright, J.).
"See. e.g., Payne v. State, 231 Ark. 727, 729, 332 S.W.2d 233, 235 (1960); People v.
Brommel, 56 Cal. 2d 629, 634, 364 P.2d 845, 848, 15 Cal. Rptr. 909, 912 (1961); Lee v. State,
236 Miss. 716, 722, 112 So. 2d 254, 256 (1959); Wechsler v. State, 172 Tex. Crim. 559, 564, 361
S.W.2d 379, 383 (1962); 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 855 (3d ed. 1940).
14 See Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241, 249-50 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (concurring opinion
of Wright, J.).Is But see id. at 250 (concurring opinion of Wright, J.).
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